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David L. Chambers 
Civilizing the Natives: Marriage 
in Post-Apartheid South Africa 
South Africa is A land of many cultures. For several hun 
dred years, British and Afrikaaner whites controlled the 
country, systematically manipulating black people to the 
whites' advantage. For the most part, however, whites toler 
ated the continuation within black communities of traditional 
marriage practices that white Christians considered uncivi 
lized. In 1994, South Africa changed governments. A black 
majority Parliament came to power, adopting a constitution 
dedicated to equality and human dignity. Four years later, 
Parliament adopted a new marriage law that, though permit 
ting some of the external trappings of the traditional marriage 
system to continue, eliminated by law much of the core of its 
male-centered rules. 
From the point of view of the legislators who voted for it, the 
new law was required in order to promote gender equality 
under the new constitution. From the point of view of tradi 
tional leaders and some other rural dwellers, the new law was 
unjustifiable because it failed to honor black people's traditions 
in a new black South Africa. This essay is about points of 
view?the multiple points of view of South Africans, and the 
point of view of one admiring American, who is trying to 
understand. 
David L. Chambers is Wade H. McCree, Jr., Collegiate Professor of Law at the 
University of Michigan Law School. 
This essay is part of a forthcoming volume, The Free Exercise of Culture, edited by R. 
Shweder, M. Minow, and H. Markus. ? Russell Sage Foundation. All rights reserved. 
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THE CUSTOMARY RULES AND PRACTICES 
About 78 percent of South Africa's population is black, about 
12 percent is white, and the rest is primarily Indian or of mixed 
race, called "coloured." Nearly half of all black Africans still 
live in rural areas, the great majority in traditional groups 
headed by hereditary kings or chiefs and by headmen and 
subchiefs. The largest of these groups are the Zulu, the Xhosa, 
the Pedi, the Sotho, the Tswana, the Tsonga, and the Swazi. All 
are hierarchically organized, and, in nearly all, only men can be 
chiefs or senior counselors. 
Each of these cultural groups has its own customs and rules? 
rituals and practices at birth, at the coming of age, at marriage, 
and at death. Indeed, within each group are subgroups with 
their own variations. The customary rules are not unalterable. 
Though certain common patterns persist through time, the ac 
tual content of rules?the so-called customary law?is revealed 
at any given time through the practices of the people who live 
by them, and practices change with changing conditions. Whether 
these practices are appropriately regarded as "law" is debat 
able, for they have no definitive textual form and are modified 
over time by the actions of those who adhere to them.1 Still, 
Africans of all sorts speak as if these practices were "law," and, 
as we will see, South Africa's new constitution itself directs 
courts to apply "customary law" in appropriate circumstances. 
The chiefs, of course, also believe in customary laws and con 
sider themselves the authoritative voice of their content. They 
or other senior leaders preside over local customary courts 
where they apply their view of the "law" to resolve disputes. 
Most black South Africans who live in rural areas follow cus 
tomary practices in their daily lives. For them, the chiefs still 
play central roles as the keepers and promoters of traditions 
and as political leaders. In last year's parliamentary elections, 
for example, the presidential candidates of all the major na 
tional political parties courted the traditional chiefs because 
they believed that the chiefs could deliver large numbers of 
votes. 
During the years of white rule, the only sort of coupling 
relationship denominated as "marriage" by law was the form 
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of Christian or civil marriage that white people practiced. The 
rules for entry into civil marriage and the legal consequences of 
it are similar to those in the United States. After changes in the 
law that were completed only in the 1980s,2 women in civil 
marriage have full legal capacity to enter into contracts and to 
hold property in their own names. Neither husband nor wife 
can marry any other person while they are still married to each 
other. And they can exit from the marriage only by securing a 
divorce through a court that applies community property rules 
to divide their assets, determines whether one should make 
additional periodic payments to the other in the form of ali 
mony, and decides who will have custody of their children. 
During the twentieth century, black South Africans who 
wished to marry had a choice. They could marry under civil 
law, and indeed, by the mid-twentieth century, many black 
Christians did so. (Most blacks who married under civil law 
also observed some customary marriage rituals as well.) The 
remaining black South Africans, probably close to a majority 
even today, marry solely within the customary group of which 
they consider themselves a part. 
The customary rules determining how a marriage is formed 
vary widely across groups but share common characteristics, 
many of which reach back many centuries.3 At root, customary 
marriage marks not the joining of two individuals but the 
joining of two families or two kinship groups and is a vehicle for 
ensuring the continuation of the male's family line. In nearly all 
groups, the groom or members of his family enter into highly 
stylized negotiations with the parents of the bride and agree on 
an amount of bridewealth, called lobolo, bogadi, and various 
other names (hereafter, lobolo), that the groom will convey to 
the parents of the bride. In the past, the lobolo was nearly 
always paid in cattle. Today the parties nearly always agree on 
a sum of money, though the amount is still commonly deter 
mined by the current cost of a certain number of cows. The 
equivalent of several hundred American dollars would be a 
common figure. That is a very large sum for most black South 
African men in their twenties. 
Upon payment of all or part of the lobolo, the performance of 
ceremonies that vary widely, and, in some groups, a period of 
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cohabitation or the birth of a child, the couple is considered 
married within their customary group. They were never, how 
ever, considered "married" under the laws of South Africa. 
Instead, they were treated as partners in a mere "customary 
union," which was a legally recognized relationship that car 
ried consequences for pensions, taxation, and so forth, but civil 
"marriage" was accorded higher legal status.4 
Just as the rules of lobolo were determined by customary law, 
so too were most of the consequences of a customary mar 
riage.5 As a broad generalization, in nearly all these groups, a 
woman upon marriage became a part of the husband's family 
and shifted from living under the control of her father to living 
under the control of her husband, her mother-in-law, and the 
head of her husband's family. Any children of the marriage 
became part of the husband's family. She had no power to enter 
into contracts or to own property in her own name. She could 
appear in a tribunal only through her husband or the head of 
her husband's family. Her husband was free to marry addi 
tional women, but she was not free to marry additional men. If 
a wife left the marriage, her parents would usually be expected 
to repay or return all or part of the lobolo, and any children 
would remain with the husband or his family. If she outlived her 
husband, she would not inherit his property. Rather, a male 
member of his biological family?his oldest son, his brother, his 
father?was considered the only appropriate heir, though the 
heir was obliged to provide in some way for the widow. In some 
groups, the widow was expected to marry another male mem 
ber of her husband's family, especially if she had not yet borne 
any children. This was the custom of levirate marriage. 
The cornerstone of the customary marriage system is the 
lobolo transaction. Lobolo retains positive and complex mean 
ing to most black Africans, including most urban black Afri 
cans.6 It stands variously as a symbol that the wife is valued, as 
a mark of the bond between families, as compensation to the 
bride's parents for the cost and effort to raise her, and, today, 
as a symbol of continuity with African traditions. For married 
women, it remains an important source of status in both rural 
and urban areas, despite the fact that some practices, such as 
levirate marriage, grow out of a view that the husband's fam 
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ily, through the payment of lobolo, has acquired the woman's 
reproductive capacity (yet another "meaning" of lobolo). 
Do women who live in rural customary groups today lead 
lives of subordination and degradation? That is a difficult ques 
tion to answer, not solely because of the difficulty of deciding 
what should count as a degrading life. I have done no empirical 
work of my own in the rural areas, and though many studies 
have been written about the experiences of black South African 
women, few are available that are recent and methodologically 
rigorous.7 It is certainly easy to find accounts from the twenti 
eth century of women who saw themselves as having been 
"sold" by their fathers to an older man they did not know, who 
experienced intercourse with him as a physical violation, and 
who were treated much like a servant.8 At the same time, most 
accounts of women's lives are mixed but more positive. H. J. 
Simons, one of the most thoughtful white South African observ 
ers of customary practices, believed that in circumstances in 
which rural husbands and wives lived in an extended family of 
the husband's, most women, while not equals, were at least 
"junior partners in a joint family enterprise."9 The system of 
rules, when it worked, ensured that no woman was without a 
man 
responsible for her well-being. And, during the marriage, 
especially after bearing children, women typically exercised 
considerable authority in the operation of their households. The 
beleaguered new wife became the powerful mother-in-law a 
generation later. Customary unions continued to be potentially 
polygamous, but fewer and fewer men could afford second 
wives. 
By the mid-twentieth century, however, large numbers of 
black Africans no longer lived in rural settings or in extended 
family arrangements, and the practice of male control of wealth 
no longer matched many urban or rural women's lives or needs. 
Many black women lived in cities and worked in the labor 
force?primarily as domestic workers?were paid directly by 
their employers, and controlled the income they earned. Large 
numbers of rural men worked in the cities or mines and pro 
vided neither support nor protection for their wives who re 
mained in the country. Polygamy was frequently a warped 
parody of its earlier form: many men took a wife in the country, 
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then moved to the city, leaving wife and children behind, and 
married again. 
By moving to the cities, many women (and young men) largely 
evaded the control of the male elders, but many rural women 
still suffered under the old practices. Some stayed in marriages 
they wanted to leave because of pressure from their fathers, 
who sided with their husbands and who did not want to return 
lobolo. Others were left without resources on the death of their 
husbands when a male relative of the husband claimed the 
family assets but failed to provide for the widow's care. More 
over, the tradition of male dominance, coupled with the decline 
of extended family living arrangements, has probably contrib 
uted to the extremely high levels of physical abuse to which 
African men subject their wives.10 
To be sure, among white South Africans married under civil 
law, it is equally debatable whether wives experience the equal 
ity in their relationships that the official rules now proclaim. In 
South Africa as elsewhere, white men earn more than white 
women, and neither British nor Afrikaner South African men 
are known for egalitarian attitudes toward marriage. Still, by 
the 1990s, married women were formal equals under the com 
mon-law rules but not under the customary practices. 
DOMINANCE AND TOLERANCE 
The story of the positions South African colonial settlers took 
toward customary rules and practices during the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuries is far too complex to relate in a short 
essay.11 As a broad generalization, the British and Afrikaner 
settlers regarded black African marital practices as barbaric? 
at worst, lobolo as a transaction in which a man sold his 
daughter into slavery, polygamy as uncurbed lust?but in the 
end colonial and settler governments generally tolerated the 
practices because, in a context in which blacks greatly outnum 
bered whites, tolerance was consistent with efficient adminis 
tration.12 The British secured the reluctant loyalty of the chiefs 
by protecting the chiefs' authority. The chiefs in turn applied 
the customary rules to their peoples, who provided an inexpen 
sive source of labor to white farmers and households. As stated 
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by Theophilis Shepstone, architect of the British policy in Natal, 
"The main object of keeping natives under their own law is to 
ensure control of them. You cannot control savages by civilized 
law."13 
As part of their system of control, the British government 
created special "native" courts to apply customary law in 
disputes between black South Africans. In some parts of the 
country, the customary rules were codified by British lawmak 
ers, who learned the rules from chiefs and other headmen and 
rendered them into English legal language that was often inac 
curate in translation and often more male-centered than actual 
practice.14 Courts routinely applied these codified customary 
rules, but, even so, there were limits on the degree to which they 
were 
willing to give such rules legal effect. In each of the 
ordinances and statutes that authorized courts to apply custom 
ary laws in suits between blacks, a proviso always directed the 
court not to do so when it found a particular custom "repug 
nant to the general principles of humanity recognized through 
out the whole civilized world"15 or 
"opposed to the principles of 
public policy or natural justice."16 In addition, the same courts 
refused to treat women within customary unions as wives for 
purposes of certain common law and statutory benefits. For 
example, unlike a wife in a civil marriage, a customary spouse 
could not collect from certain statutory insurance funds on the 
death of her husband in a motor vehicle accident.17 
By the late twentieth century, courts rarely invoked the re 
pugnancy clauses and Parliament had extended some statutory 
benefits of civil marriage to spouses in customary unions. The 
unions of rural black people were accepted as "marriages" by 
all the people who mattered to them, and, for most, the state 
recognized their relationship in the few contexts in which it 
made any difference. Unlike the U.S. government in its cam 
paign against the Mormon church in the late nineteenth cen 
tury, the whites in South Africa, however brutal their policies, 
never declared polygamy a crime for people living in customary 
unions, never prosecuted and imprisoned thousands of polyga 
mists or drove thousands of others into hiding, and never sought 
to remove the children of polygamous parents on the grounds 
that their practices were inherently harmful.18 
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THE NEW CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 
After World War II, the Afrikaner-led National Party won 
control of South Africa's government and, over time, imposed 
its apartheid policy of rigid segregation. Blacks ceased to be 
citizens of South Africa. Those who were needed by whites for 
labor were forced to live as migrants at the mines or in all-black 
townships outside the cities, and those who were not needed 
were relegated to "homelands" ruled by black leaders who 
were in large part puppets of the South African government. In 
1994, after years of internal struggle and international condem 
nation, the National Party agreed to relinquish control to the 
black majority. Parliament adopted a new constitution, called 
the Interim Constitution, hammered out between the National 
Party and the African National Congress (ANC) with the par 
ticipation of other smaller parties, and the homelands were 
reabsorbed into South Africa. The promulgation of the Consti 
tution led directly to the elections in 1994 in which black South 
Africans, voting for the first time, brought a black-controlled 
government into power. Two years later, in 1996, a Final 
Constitution was adopted, drafted by a committee of Parlia 
ment dominated by the ANC. 
The Interim and Final Constitutions sound many themes? 
individual freedom, human dignity, universal suffrage, recon 
ciliation between racial groups, a parliamentary system of 
government?but no theme is sounded more forcefully than 
that of equality. That is hardly a surprise given the nation's 
sordid history. Somewhat surprising to many, however, is that 
the new constitutions emphasize equality based on sex as strongly 
as they do equality based on race. The prominent place of sex 
equality grew out of the ANC's adoption in the 1960s of West 
ern human-rights ideology as well as the participation of South 
African women and women's groups in the anti-apartheid lib 
eration efforts and in the negotiations over the Constitution.19 
As completed, the Interim Constitution opens with these words: 
In humble submission to Almighty God, 
We, the people of South Africa declare that? 
WHEREAS there is a need to create a new order in which all South 
Africans will be entitled to a common South African citizenship in 
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a sovereign and democratic constitutional state in which there is 
equality between men and women and people of all races so that 
all citizens shall be able to enjoy and exercise their fundamental 
rights and freedoms ... 
Similarly, the first substantive section of the Bill of Rights in 
the Final Constitution provides that "everyone is equal before 
the law and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the 
law," and continues by declaring that neither the state nor any 
person may: "...unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly 
against anyone on one or more grounds, including race, gender, 
sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, colour, 
sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, 
culture, language and birth."20 
The Constitutions' drafters were well aware of the potential 
impact of the equality clauses on the gender-based family rules 
of the customary groups. So too were the traditional leaders. In 
the deliberations, the leaders advocated that customary rules, 
and particularly customary family rules, be treated as a sepa 
rate system of laws exempt from the Constitution.21 The chiefs 
and other traditional leaders argued that traditional ways, 
tolerated but demeaned during apartheid, deserved to be em 
braced in a new black nation. 
As eventually adopted, however, the Interim and Final Con 
stitutions took a quite different approach to the customary 
leaders and customary rules. The drafters?though many con 
sidered themselves members of the customary groups?held 
less positive views than the chiefs about the customary rules 
and about the chiefs themselves. Many of the new black mem 
bers of Parliament viewed themselves as fortunate to be city 
dwellers today, free of the day-to-day control of their male 
elders. Many of the new members who were women dismissed 
the traditional leaders' call for a revival of African identity and 
customs as a ruse to justify the continued repression of black 
women.22 Moreover, many ANC members, including many black 
members, had spent the previous three decades condemning 
appeals to ethnic affiliations, because the white apartheid gov 
ernment had exploited such appeals to divide black South Afri 
cans against themselves. 
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In the eyes of the ANC, many of the tribal leaders themselves 
stood in a morally ambiguous position. Many were viewed 
simply as old men selfishly protecting their own power and as 
social conservatives out of step with progressive ideas. The 
version of customary law they defended was, in the views of 
many, inauthentic, distorted in the last century by the interac 
tion of patriarchal black male elders and patriarchal white 
male colonial judges and administrators. Worse, many leaders 
had, before and during the apartheid era, entered into a Faustian 
bargain with the white government, under which they were 
permitted to retain control over the members of their groups 
only so long as they refrained from supporting the ANC efforts 
to overturn the existing regime. A few of the traditional leaders 
in Parliament had been celebrated opponents of apartheid, but 
others, many of whom were members of the Zulu-dominated 
Inkatha Freedom Party, were seen by the ANC as collaborators 
with the white rulers. 
Thus, in the end, the Final Constitution, adopted by a black 
majority Parliament, reflects a mixed view of blacks' own tra 
ditional cultures. On the affirming side, the Final Constitution 
declares that the country's official languages, formerly Afri 
kaans and English, were now to be "Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, 
siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, 
isiXhosa, and isiZulu."23 The Constitution further guarantees 
to all the right "to participate in the cultural life of their choice" 
and directs courts to 
"apply customary law when that law is 
applicable."24 It even provides that "the institution, status, and 
role of traditional leadership, according to customary law, are 
recognized."25 On the other hand, the Constitution simulta 
neously makes customary rules and the traditional leaders sub 
ordinate to Parliament and the Bill of Rights. Yes, all citizens 
have the right to participate in the cultural life of their choice, 
"but," continues the same provision, "no one exercising these 
rights may do so in a manner inconsistent with any provision of 
the Bill of Rights," and the traditional leadership may continue 
to hold their offices but 
"subject to the Constitution." And yes, 
courts are to apply customary law, but they are to do so 
"subject to the Constitution and any applicable legislation that 
specifically deals with customary law." Customary law, that is, 
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may be changed by Parliament as freely as it can change judge 
made common law or its own prior legislation. 
Given these constitutional provisions, it may appear that the 
old gender-based customary family rules must be rejected to 
day as unconstitutional, inconsistent with the equality clause of 
the Bill of Rights. And perhaps the new Constitutional Court 
will someday so hold. But remember that the Constitution does 
not prohibit all discrimination, only discrimination that is "un 
fair."26 And even "unfair discrimination" (an elusive notion 
under the court's early jurisprudence)27 will be tolerated if the 
state can demonstrate that a discriminatory regulation comes 
within the terms of a general limitations clause in the Constitu 
tion that permits restricting any of the rights in the Bill of 
Rights "to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human 
dignity, equality, and freedom."28 
THE RECOGNITION OF CUSTOMARY MARRIAGES ACT OF 1998 
In November of 1998, four years after coming to power, Par 
liament adopted new legislation regarding customary marriage. 
The legislation was developed for Parliament by the South 
African Law Commission, a government agency long in exist 
ence but reconstituted under the new government. The commis 
sion in turn appointed a project committee that developed the 
proposal. When the committee began its work, the members 
agreed that "customary unions" entered into in the past would 
be relabeled as 
"marriages." No more separate and unequal. 
About marriages entered into in the future, however, the com 
mission was more uncertain how to proceed and received many 
suggestions from academics and groups. At the extremes, two 
quite different models were available. 
The committee might have recommended that Parliament 
adopt a single national law of marriage that prescribed for all 
South Africans the requirements and consequences of marriage, 
just as nearly all states in the United States have a single 
statutory form of marriage. Couples would be free to conduct 
their marriage ceremonies any way they wished?the delivery 
of cattle, an exchange of vows in church, a feast of goat, a five 
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tiered cake, whatever?but the requirements of a legally valid 
marriage, the registration system and the legal effects of mar 
riage, would be the same for all. As the new uniform law, 
Parliament might have cast into statutory language the rules of 
one of the customary groups or some amalgam of customary 
rules. Or it might have adopted for everyone the existing civil 
law under which whites and Christian blacks typically married. 
Such an approach was conceivable, but the committee never 
seriously considered it. No one set of rules could be acceptable 
to all groups. Each customary group was proud of its practices 
and would not have given them up lightly for some other 
customary group's rules. Zulu practices could not be privileged 
over Xhosa, or Xhosa over Zulu. By the same token, South 
African Christians would have found unacceptable any system 
in which a husband could have more than one wife. 
The second idea was simply to declare that all unions and 
marriages were henceforth considered marriages and, for the 
future, leave to each couple to choose the marital regime under 
which they wished to be united. All systems would be recog 
nized as equal, and the state would enforce the rules of the 
marital system chosen by the couple or empower the tribunals 
of the group to enforce those rules. This, roughly speaking, is 
the approach that has been taken in Israel regarding Islamic 
and Christian marriages. 
This approach had much more appeal to the committee. It 
was also the approach that the chiefs and other traditional 
leaders of the customary groups wanted. But it was one that, in 
its purest form, was unacceptable to many liberals and femi 
nists, both black and white, for in their view many of the 
customary rules bearing on married women were intolerable 
and unconstitutional. In fact, some women had fought for the 
gender equality language in the Constitution as much to secure 
equal rights at home as to secure equal rights in the public 
sphere.29 
In the end, the committee and commission, after receiving 
written comments from a large number of individuals and groups, 
recommended a middle course?and Parliament in turn ac 
cepted the commission's recommendations.30 As adopted, the 
first substantive section of the act?called the Recognition of 
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Customary Marriages Act of 1998?declares that all custom 
ary unions entered into in the past are relabeled "marriages" 
and that, for the future, all customary marriages that comply 
with the provisions of the act are valid. The rest of the act 
regulates the content of customary marriage. Three themes 
dominate. The first is to ensure that each partner truly chooses 
to marry. Marriage must be with "consent." The second is to 
declare women and men formal equals within the marriage 
relationship. In the absence of a pr?nuptial contract, spouses in 
customary marriages will be treated as holding property equally 
as community property. Married women are given the power to 
acquire and dispose of assets, to enter into contracts, and to 
litigate in their own names. The final theme is to inject the state 
bureaucracy into the regulation of customary marriages, first 
by requiring that all marriages be registered with a government 
agency and second by permitting divorce only when it is granted 
by a family court judge. The judge will divide the couple's 
property, award alimony where appropriate, and decide which 
parent is the more appropriate custodian for the children. 
Within this structure, some important aspects of customary 
marriage are permitted to continue. Most significantly, the 
customary groups are free to retain lobolo as a condition of a 
valid marriage. In addition, child marriage can still occur if a 
group's rules permit it and if, in the particular case, the child 
"consents" and both parents concur. Levirate marriage?the 
widow's marrying of her late husband's brother?can still oc 
cur as long as the widow consents. And even polygyny is 
permitted to continue as long as the interests of the first wife 
are protected. A man may have a valid second marriage during 
the course of a first marriage as long as he enters into a written 
contract with his first wife fairly dividing the property accrued 
to that point and persuades a family court, after a hearing, that 
the contract is equitable to everyone concerned. 
How much of customary marriage remains? If lobolo is the 
heart of customary marriage, customary marriage still has its 
heart. If polygyny is of symbolic importance even if in decline, 
it too survives. From another perspective, however, the new act 
maintains the trappings of customary marriage but empties it of 
most of its content. Women are now the formal equals of men. 
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Customary courts no longer have any formal authority to re 
solve disputes. The act replaces a patriarchal view of marriage 
with a partnership view. Even the polygamy provision is struc 
tured to make sure that the first wife or wives get their full 
share of the partnership out of the marriage up to that point. 
And, although customary courts may perform mediation, they 
cease to have any formal authority to order a resolution of a 
marital dispute. 
DEMOCRACY AND THE RECOGNITION OF MINORITY CULTURES 
Two quite different views might be taken of the process that 
produced this revolutionary legislation and of the substance of 
the act itself. 
The first would be to regard it simply as a healthy example 
of democracy in action. Writing thirty years ago, Simons be 
lieved that in the face of the changes wrought by a market 
economy, both polygamy and lobolo had outlived their original 
protective and communal functions and ought to be reformed or 
abolished, but he also believed that "Africans themselves, and 
not an all-white legislature, should bring about the change."31 
The new law is, to use Simons's term, genuinely a work of 
"Africans themselves."32 The majority of the members of the 
new Parliament are black. If they are married, lobolo was 
almost certainly negotiated. The act can thus be seen as law 
reform from the inside, by a legislature elected by all the 
people, including the rural black people most affected by it. 
Indeed, some black South Africans regard Mandela, Mbeki, 
and the other black Parliament members as the democratically 
elected successors to the hereditary chiefs. 
The content of the act can also be defended substantively as 
paying just the right level of tribute to tradition. Most black 
South Africans, both women and men, accept the ceremonies 
and financial transactions associated with becoming married 
that are preserved by the new legislation. The social meanings 
of these transactions are changing with time and are less op 
pressive today to women than in the past. On the other hand, 
the act appropriately repudiated the old limitations on married 
women's capacities to contract, inherit, hold land in their own 
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names, and appear in court. These rules not only constricted 
women's position within the home and family but also curtailed 
women's dealings with third parties not part of their group. 
They were also the rules whose historic authenticity had been 
most discredited and whose boundaries today are most con 
tested in the daily lives of the members of the groups. The new 
law thus enables black urban and rural women to enter into 
marriage through the familiar lobolo rituals that they accept, 
while empowering them as legal equals in the private and 
public sphere. Over time, lobolo, like the engagement ring in 
Western cultures, may be transformed into a symbol simply of 
affection, commitment, and respect. 
A second view of the new legislation is quite different in that 
it regards it as the suppression of minority cultures. The cus 
tomary groups are now a nonurban minority of the population 
who did not genuinely exert a voice in the legislation. As a 
formal matter, the Parliament of South Africa, like the Parlia 
ment of some other democracies, is not elected by districts. 
Each party creates a nationwide list of candidates, voters cast 
one vote for their party of choice, and each party gets a number 
of seats in Parliament roughly equal to the percentage it re 
ceives of the total vote. A considerable majority of the ANC 
members of Parliament are urban dwellers. 
Of course, urban Parliament members might seek the views 
of rural people and adopt legislation that serves their needs, but 
Parliament in adopting this legislation relied on the Law Com 
mission, and the commission in turn had little systematic infor 
mation about the opinions of rural dwellers. Many rural resi 
dents will welcome the legislation as adopted, but others will 
not. It is not the old men alone who believe in the traditional 
ways. In much of Africa, rural women are the community's 
most rigorous enforcers of customs that appear to outsiders to 
subjugate women.33 From the point of view of some practitio 
ners of customary rules, the passage of the Recognition of 
Customary Marriage Act must contain a bitter irony: for two 
hundred years, white governments oppressed black people but 
at least permitted them to practice their old family ways; no 
sooner did a black-controlled government take over than it 
gutted its peoples' own traditions?"recognition" by eviscera 
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tion. Patikile Holomisa is a member of Parliament, a traditional 
chief, a controversial politician, and president of the Congress 
of Traditional Leaders. After the drafting of the Final Consti 
tution, he lamented, "Such is the tragedy of postcolonial Africa 
that, after attainment of freedom, its political leaders find it 
easy, convenient, and acceptable to adopt the political system 
of their erstwhile oppressors and yet find it difficult and prob 
lematic to restore indigenous forms of rule."34 In his view, the 
black ANC members of Parliament had swallowed feminist and 
liberal ideologies foreign to Africa and inimical to its way of 
life. To him, the Parliament members were much like the British 
judges of a century before who had rejected some customary 
marriage practices as "repugnant" to civilized society. 
As Holomisa's critique suggests, the new legislation dishon 
ors the customary groups in a more fundamental way than by 
simply changing the substantive rules of marriage. It also changes 
who makes the decisions about the rules, for the system of 
customary rules rested on living practice, with the traditional 
leaders influencing its shape through their role as resolvers of 
disputes. They were lawgivers. The new legislation takes the 
decision about the content of rules out of the fluid process of 
living practice and takes the job of judging out of the hands of 
the traditional leaders. 
Which view of the legislation is more accurate? That it was 
the sound product of a sound process? Or that, whatever the 
end result, the process inappropriately slighted the autonomy of 
traditional groups? The slighting, if it occurred at all, surely did 
not exceed the reach of Parliament's powers under the new 
Constitution. The Constitution explicitly makes customary law 
subject to change by Parliament. On the other hand, Parliament 
might have chosen to accord the customary groups and their 
leaders more deference than it did, in recognition of the fact 
that the Constitution also explicitly recognizes the "status and 
role of traditional leadership," directs courts to apply "custom 
ary law," and proclaims the freedom of individuals to partici 
pate in the cultural lives of their choice. A reasonable reader of 
these sections might infer that the drafters had something more 
in mind than simply preserving old forms while draining them 
of content. 
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What if Parliament had adopted a recognition act that actu 
ally recognized customary rules in their totality and left it up to 
the groups themselves to make changes from within over time? 
And what if the customary courts, not the government courts, 
had been entrusted with the initial responsibility of protecting 
married women from "unjust discrimination" under the Consti 
tution?35 Might this approach have produced over time an 
egalitarian version of marriage consistent with the new consti 
tutional regime but more consistent with the honoring of tradi 
tional groups and practices? I am not at all certain that it would 
have, but here are some reasons for having given it a try. 
Thandabuntu Nhlapo, a member of the South African Law 
Commission who served as the liaison between the commission 
and Parliament on customary marriage legislation, wrote an 
article a few years before the act's passage that suggests a basis 
for concern about the approach his own commission and Par 
liament took. In the article, he strongly criticizes the operation 
of the existing customary rules as they applied to women, but 
worries that "total abandonment of these [traditional] values 
may pose an even greater threat to social cohesion by creating 
a cultural vacuum in circumstances in which there are no ready 
substitutes."36 He worries about treating women as indepen 
dent when they are not yet independent in fact. Consider as a 
single example the widow who asserts her newly created prop 
erty rights on the death of her husband but who, in doing so, 
offends the husband's family. She may gain a short-term benefit 
from the community property at the price of a long-term loss of 
the links to the husband's clan.37 
Yet another ground for leaning toward reform from within is 
provided by Justice Albie Sachs of South Africa's new Consti 
tutional Court, a person who has written and thought a great 
deal about customary law.38 Sachs gave a speech in which he 
expressed confidence in the capacity of customary law to evolve 
to address new social problems. He spoke of what he consid 
ered the core notions of customary law that deserve to survive: 
The deep principles of social respect, coupled with the all-embrac 
ing processes involving listening and hearing ... of r?int?gration 
of defaulters and delinquents into the community, of attempting 
always to restore equilibrium ... At the heart of traditional Afri 
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can legal concern is a sense of human solidarity, of regard for all. 
No one is cast out or left by the wayside.39 
He believed that many surviving customary rules, "formal 
ized and frozen by magistrates, missionaries, and patriarchal 
male elders in the colonial and apartheid era," were unfit for 
the current circumstances of African women and particularly 
African widows, but called not for substantive remedial legis 
lation but for a revitalization of customary law that would 
return it to its roots. "It is important," he said, "that democracy 
not be regarded as a blunt instrument that clubs customary law 
on the head." He reported on his observations during eleven 
years of exile in Mozambique. (He was an ANC partisan whose 
arm was mangled by a bomb planted by the South African 
police in an assassination attempt.) There, he recalled, a newly 
democratic government valiantly created "community courts" 
made up of "people of standing" in the locality. The judges sat 
in panels of three or more, at least one of whom was a woman. 
The panels dealt with family issues with informed wisdom, 
reaching "fair and practical" results. Sachs did not recommend 
exactly the same approach for South Africa, but sought the help 
of his audience in designing new institutional arrangements 
with comparable promise. 
If Sachs's ideas had been at the heart of the legislation, the 
traditional leaders in South Africa might have been nudged to 
include women in decision-making and to respond in new ways 
to women's and children's needs for new forms of economic 
protection in an era in which men are not always nearby to 
provide support. They might have learned that new rules are 
needed to make certain that women and children are not "cast 
out or left by the wayside." Barbara Oomen, a Dutch anthro 
pologist who has been studying rural black life in the village of 
Hoepakranz in the Northern Province over the last few years, 
recently related the story of Rosa Diphofa, a single mother who 
wanted a plot of land of her own to build a home.40 She "had 
read in the papers" that women were now entitled to land on 
the same basis as men. Though she was unable to speak for 
herself at the chief's court, an uncle spoke there on her behalf. 
The chief, Rosa reported, was "most surprised" by her claim 
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but, after a "big discussion" with his advisors about the new 
rights, granted her request. Rosa was proud of her achieve 
ment: 
His decision went through the village like a bushfire. . . . The 
women, especially the single ones, were very happy for me and 
helped me with the money from the Credit Club?1100 rands?to 
buy corrugated iron sheets. . . . They have helped me with the 
construction. People were very surprised that I knew how to build 
a mud wall but I just sat down, thought about it, and started. All 
the time I felt this strength. Now there are other women who will 
also ask for land. 
Even without an altered perception of women's entitlements, 
the chiefs might have had a pragmatic incentive to foster change 
in order to encourage women to choose to marry under custom 
ary rules at a time when rural women are gradually becoming 
able to exercise other choices. In urban areas, customary prac 
tices have already begun to change. A recent empirical study of 
black Africans living in urban townships near Pretoria found 
that today at the dissolution of a marriage, lobolo is rarely 
returned to the husband even when the woman is "at fault," 
and children typically remain with their mothers.41 
As an American outsider, I find an intuitive appeal in leaving 
to each customary group the task of negotiating change inter 
nally. The old rules protect the status of men, but men were 
expected to bear significant responsibilities for their families? 
their wives, their children, and their brothers' children. Might 
not internally generated changes to provide for women and 
children have commanded more respect and adherence from 
those to whom they apply and left the rural women who pressed 
for them with more real power in their communities? More 
over, might not the changes that occur reflect more understand 
ing of local needs than bureaucratic courts applying uniform 
rules of community property? In some ways the claims for 
leaving changes up to the groups themselves are little different 
from the traditional arguments that are made in the United 
States for leaving family law rules up to the states rather than 
the federal government?the arguments for government closer 
to the governed. 
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Having said all this, I admit that I thoroughly distrust my 
intuitions. I have a typical liberal American's preference for 
protecting diversity without an adequate appreciation of the 
circumstances of the people who are stuck with living these 
diverse lives.42 My version of change may well be romantic and 
implausible. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 
probably rests on a realistic assessment by the ANC that the 
men who are customary leaders are simply unlikely to be will 
ing to share power with women or to transform and revitalize 
customary rules in the ways that Sachs expects. Few chiefs will 
respond like the chief in Hoepakranz. Moreover, internal re 
form would inevitably stretch over many years. A virtue of the 
act as adopted is that it gives property rights and other protec 
tions to women who marry now and who, especially in the rural 
areas, cannot realistically demand to marry under civil law. 
These women have been subordinated by whites and by black 
men for many centuries and have waited too long for equality 
before the law. 
Of course, whether these rights that are due to them "now" 
under the act will actually accrue to the women for whom they 
are intended is a different question. The experience in America 
suggests that statutory reform in family law rarely produces 
much immediate change in behavior within people's homes. 
That experience is particularly likely to be repeated in South 
Africa where Parliament, which has passed much forward 
looking legislation in the last few years, has often been unable, 
in a faltering economy, to provide the financial resources and 
infrastructure necessary to make new programs come to life.43 
The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act was adopted 
over a year ago. It has not yet been implemented. No registra 
tion system is in place. Family courts have not yet begun to hear 
divorces in cases of customary marriages. Indeed, in many 
rural areas, no accessible family courts exist. 
When I asked people who had been involved in the legislative 
process whether they thought men and women would comply 
with the legislation, I got varying responses. Several thought 
that most couples would fail to register their marriages (and, 
indeed, the act itself, recognizing this probability, provides that 
failure to register shall not affect the validity of a customary 
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marriage). Only one person to whom I spoke believed there was 
any likelihood that the sorts of men who currently enter polygy 
nous marriages would comply with the requirement of coming 
to court for approval before taking a second wife. And few 
thought that most women or men married under customary law 
would, upon breaking up, petition a court for a divorce, even if 
there were a court nearby. For most black Africans in rural 
areas, it is possible that, for the near future at least, life will go 
on pretty much as it has. Changes in practices will occur over 
time not because of a statute, not because of courts, but because 
of the pressures of the market economy and the images of an 
outside world that rural people increasingly see. If this is so, the 
customary groups may obtain the opportunity that Parliament 
thought it had rejected of reforming the old practices from 
within. 
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